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Since the last World War, continual pressure has been exerted upon
Congress to enact legislation which would eradicate the thought that
financial profit can be made out of war. Many methods have been sug-
gested,' but the one hit upon as being the most expedient was that of
renegotiating all war contracts so as to compel the contractor to give
back all that he had made above what would be considered a fair and
aquitable profit. Legislation incorporating that idea was enacted in the
Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Act, 2 subsequently
to be amended by the Revenue Act of 1943, 3 which abrogated all legis-
lation that had been enacted in the interim between two wars. That
statute, as amended, has become the sole means of curtailing profits
ror competitive bidding has been done away with, not because it was
not a tried and well-seasoned method of obtaining necessary supplies at
a fair price, but because it was too slow and cumbersome a device to
meet the needs of the emergency.
A brief resume of the renegotiation statute may prove helpful to an
Linderstanding of the legal issues herein discussed. The method by which
the government was to be permitted to recapture excessive profits was
to authorize the appropriate governmental official, 4 when making a con-
tract, to insert therein a provision for the renegotiation thereof. 5 If ex-
cessive profits were subsequently determined to exist, the official was
authorized and directed to eliminate the excess either (1) by revising
the terms of the contract, (2) by withholding money due to the con-
tractor under the terms thereof, (3) by withholding money due to a
subcontractor, (4) by obtaining repayment or credit, (5) by directing
the contractor to withhold money from the subcontractor, or (6) by any
combination of these methods. By express language, the statute was
made applicable to all contracts and subcontracts theretofore made,
whether containing a renegotiation or recapture clause, unless final pay-
ment thereon had been made before the effective date of the statute. 6
The sole definition of "excessive profits" to be found in the act
states that such term means "the portion of the profits derived from
1 Approximately 170 bills and resolutions were offered in Congress between
1919 and 1942. One of the factors leading to legislation on the subject was the
decision in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 62 S. Ct. 581, 86
L. Ed. 855 (1942), in which a recovery of 22% of cost was allowed to a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of wartime shipping, the court there declaring that
if "the executive is in need of additional laws to protect the nation from war
profiteering, the Constitution has given to Congress, not the Court, the power to
make them." See 315 U. S. 289 at 309, 62 S. Ct. 581, 88 L. Ed. 855 at 868.
2 56 Stat. at L. 245, Title IV, §403; 50 U. S. C. A. §1191.
8 H. R. 3687, Title VII, §701 et seq.; 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 83 (1944).
4 The list of officials entitled to call for renegotiation of contracts is set forth
in 56 Stat. at L. 245(a); 50 U. S. C. A. §1191(a).
5 The statute applies, however, only to contracts or subcontracts in excess of
$100,000: 56 Stat. at L. 245(b); 50 U. S. C. A. §1191(b).
6 56 Stat. at L. 245(c) (6); 50 U. S. C. A. §1191(c) (6).
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contracts with the Departments and subcontractors which is determined
in accordance with the section to be excessive," but in arriving at that
determination certain factors are to be taken into consideration such as
the efficiency of the contractor, the reasonableness of costs and profits,
the amount and source of public and private capital employed, the ex-
tent of risk assumed, the nature and extent of contribution to the war
effort, the character of the business, and such other factors as fair and
equitable dealing might require.
7
Several aspects of this legislation must have consideration, if possible,
in arriving at a determination of its constitutionality. The first of these,
of course, is the national emergency which produced such a law. Follow-
ing the attack on Pearl Harbor, a nation of peaceful people, unprepared
for world-wide conflict, had to be converted into a fighting machine with
all possible dispatch. The older method of competitive bidding was
perforce set aside for the time being. Great quantities of materiel had
to be obtained, so industries had to cease their peacetime pursuits and
equip themselves for the output of military weapons and supplies. The
manufacture of peacetime commodities was, in large part, prohibited
so industry was forced to turn to the federal government for contracts
and orders if it wanted to continue in business, even if it had not pa-
triotically proffered its help.
The early contracts let by the government contained no renegotia-
tion clauses, nor even the suggestion of any, and were made by both
contracting parties in all good faith and on a purely voluntary basis.
After the passage of the statute in question, however, all contracts there-
after let contained renegotiation provisions which the contractors had to
accept. The only alternatives were to enter into some other form of civil-
ian business for which the contractors were probably totally unsuited and
lacking in experience, or else not do business at all. The first question
that arises, then, is whether these more or less unilateral contracts,
forced upon contractors in an emergency, are even enforceable. Had the
absence of freedom to contract arisen between ordinary persons, the
answer would be obvious. Should it be different because a sovereign
government is concerned? When the statute is applied to contracts made
prior to its effective date, there is the additional question as to whether
or not the federal government is bound by the terms of its own contracts
.or is free to say that a provision may be subsequently interpolated there-
in, without consent, calling for renegotiation in order to prevent the
contractor from making more than a just and fair profit.
In that regard, it should be remembered that Alexander Hamilton
once said: "When a government enters into a contract with an individ-
ual, it deposes as to the matter of the contract its constitutional author-
ity, and exchanges the character of legislator for that of a moral agent,
with the same rights and obligations as an individual. Its promises may
be justly considered as excepted out of its power to legislate.. .It is, in
theory, impossible to reconcile the two ideas of a promise which obliges
7 H. R. 3687, Title VII, §701 (b) (4) (a); 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 84 (1944).
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with a power to make a law which can vary the effect of it." 8 If that
remark is true, then the government, when making a contract for war
supplies, enters into an obligation to which it is presumably bound as
closely as is the contractor yet, through the idea of renegotiation, it may
seek to hold the contractor to his end of the bargain while not performing
according to the tenor of its own obligations.
To say that, because of a war emergency, it would be unconscionable
to hold the government to its promises has the effect of placing it in the
category of the infant or the incompetent person. Certainly, one who
deals with persons of that character must deal at his own peril. But it
would take an unusually bold individual to assert that the same thing
ought to be said of a person who deals with a sovereign government. That
such is far from being the case is illustrated by language in the case
of Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. United States,9 where
the court said: "The Government... cannot impose new contracts upon
those with whom it deals. It might, by a repeal of the contract expressly
stipulated, restore the previous state, and claim the bare rights it had
before; but it cannot do more than that. It certainly cannot retain the
obligation of the contract as against the Company, and at the same
time vary its own, unless it has reserved the right to do so, in the contract
itself."10
If, then, the federal government, when attempting to enter into a
contract with a private contractor, departs from its position as a sovereign
power and takes upon itself the attributes and moral obligations of an
individual, it has the power to bind itself as would an individual. Rights
arising under such contracts are rights which must be protected by
constitutional guarantee, for in Lynch v. United States" it was declared
that: "The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken
without making just compensation. Valid contracts are property, whether
the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State, or the United
States. Rights against the United States arising out of a contract with it
are protected by the Fifth Amendment.' 2 That point of view is borne
out by the majority opinion in the "Sinking Fund" cases, 13 wherein the
court said: "The United States are as much bound by their contracts
as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much a
repudiation, with all the -wrong and reproach that term implies, as it
would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a
citizen."'1 4 Even the dissenting opinion to that case spoke most strongly
on this point, for Mr. Justice Strong declared that it is "as much beyond
the power of a Legislature, under any pretense, to alter a contract into
which the government has entered with a private individual, as it is
8 Hamilton, Works (Constitutional Edition, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York,
1903), Vol. 3, p. 236-7, from Report on Public Credit, Jan. 20, 1795.
9 104 U. S. (14 Otto) 680, 26 L. Ed. 891 (1882).
10 104 U. S. (14 Otto) 680 at 684, 26 L. Ed. 891 at 892.
11 292 U. S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434 (1934).
12 292 U. S. 571 at 579, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434 at 1440.
13 99 U. S. (9 Otto) 700, 25 L. Ed. 496 (1879).
14 99 U. S. (9 Otto) 700 at 719, 25 L. Ed. 490 at 501.
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for any other party to contract to change its terms without the consent
of the person contracting with him. As to its contracts the government
in all its departments has laid aside its sovereignty, and it stands on the
same footing with private contractors... Now, where is the power of
Congress to add new terms to any contract made with the United
States, or made between any two private individuals? Where is the power
to annul vested rights? It is certainly not to be found in the Constitution.
True, the provision that no State shall pass any law impairing the obli-
gations of contracts applies only to state legislation. For such legisla-
tion the prohibition was necessary; for State Legislatures have all legis-
lative power which is not expressly denied to them. But no necessity
existed for imposing such a limitation on the power of Congress... Con-
gress has no power except such as is necessary or proper for carrying
into execution the powers specified... I search in vain for any express
or implied grant of power to add new terms to any existing contracts
made by or with the government, or any grant of power to destroy
vested rights. No power has been given to Congress to lessen the obli-
gations of a contract between private parties by direct legislation, except
in the enactment of uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy... Much
less can it change the stipulations of the contract and impose additional
liabilities upon a contractor with the government. Such an exercise of
power would be making a contract for parties to which they never
assented."'15
The inescapable conclusion that follows is that the government, when
it enters into a contract and agrees to compensate the contractor for
services rendered, is bound to pay for those services as agreed and
cannot, by any theory of sovereignty, alter or avoid that obligation.
Nowhere in the Constitution is the power to alter the terms of a contract
delegated to Congress, and until that power is so delegated, Congress
does not have it.16
Another aspect of the problem of constitutionality concerns itself
with the question of whether or not the renegotiation statute involves a
proper delegation of legislative power. 17 Primarily, the question is
whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to delegate to
the executive department the work of determining what shall constitute
and what shall not constitute excessive profits. A solution may be ob-
tained by examining the problem from either of two points of view.
One is that the measurement of excessive profits is a matter of adminis-
15 99 U. S. (9 Otto) 700 at 732-6, 25 L. Ed. 496 at 506-8.
16 In the Gold Clause cases, particularly Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317,
55 S. Ct. 428, 79 L. Ed. 907, 95 A. L. R. 1346 (1935), it was stated that the joint
resolution of Congress prohibiting the payment of an obligation in gold was un-
constitutional as applied to government contracts.
17 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that 56 Stat. at L. 245(c) (1), 50
U. S. C. A. §1191(c) (1), reads: "Whenever, in the opinion of the Secretary of a
Department, the profits realized or likely to be realized from any contract with
such Department, or from any subcontract thereunder whether or not made by
the contractor, may be excessive, the Secretary is authorized and directed to
require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price."
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tration; that Congress, in passing the renegotiation statute, has protected
the contractor as far as possible in allowing an appeal to the Tax
Court in case he is dissatisfied with the results of the renegotiation pro-
cedure on which appeal there shall be a trial de novo from the outcome
of which there shall be no further appeal;1 8 and that, in providing for
only one renegotiation at the behest of the government, the contractor
will not be harassed. 19 While it is reasonably safe to assume that the
government will be fair in its dealing with contractors, at least so far as
it is possible to be, yet a great many people question the ability of
governmental officials to be fair, however well-meaning their intentions
might be, when there is no set standard for determining what amounts
to an excessive profit without the official measuring that profit on a
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis.
In the course of the administration of the renegotiation power to
date, there are no known instances where suit has been filed and ad-
judicated in which the government has sought to recapture what it
sees fit to call "excessive profits." Subsequent to the passage of the act
in question, however, the authority conferred thereby was re-delegated
to certain price adjustment boards set up to do the actual work of
renegotiating the contracts. To such boards were distributed certain
scales of profit to be allowed each contractor figured on a percentage
basis of the cost of the business being done. Their work then came merely
to be a matter of determining the amount of business done and then
multiplying that figure by the appropriate percentage, and all money
realized by the contractor above that amount would be the sum to be
recaptured. But the First War Powers Act 20 and Executive Order 900121
specifically prohibit the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost method of con-
tracting, so it would seem that the government violated its own statute
in forcing the contractor into a contract where the profits to be realized
would, as a matter of fact, and according to government dictate, be
computed on that forbidden basis. There is little wonder, then, that few
people support that approach to the problem.
The other point of view would treat the delegation of power as highly
improper when examined in the light of all existing precedents. It was
18 H. R. 3687, Title VII, §701(e) (1), 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 93 (1944), declares that:
"Any contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by an order of the Board determining
the amount of excessive profits . . .may, within ninety days . . . after the mail-
ing of the notice of such order ...file a petition with The Tax Court of the
United States for a redetermination thereof. Upon such filing such court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction, by order, to finally determine the amount, if any, of
such excessive profits . . . and such determination shall not be reviewed or
redetermined by any court or agency. . . .A proceeding before the Tax Court
to finally determine the amount, if any, of excessive profits shall not be treated
as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board, but shall be treated
as a proceeding de novo." Section 701(e) (2), 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 94 (1944),
permits a similar petition as to contracts made prior to the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1943.
19 H. R. 3687, Title VII, §701(b) (c) (4), 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 90 (1944).
20 55 Stat. at L. 839, 50 U. S. C. A. §611.
21 6 Fed. Reg. 6787, Title II, §6, appended to 50 U. S. C. A. §611.
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Montesquieu who said: "When the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there
can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner." 22 His words were echoed by Blackstone when he
wrote: "In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the
right both of making and enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the
same man, or one and the same body of men; and whenever these two
powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magis-
trate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical
manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with
all the power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give to himself.
But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands,
the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power,
as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith
of the liberty of the subject."
23
Despite such warnings, there has been an ever-growing tendency
to merge the three branches of the government, particularly the legis-
lative and the executive ones, through a system of administrative
bodies, resulting in the placing of almost unlimited discretion in the
hands of administrators. Such may be a simple way to handle a difficult
situation especially when standards of measurement of authority are
not easy to fix. But the fact that the problem is difficult should not
create the right to alter, without due process of law, the very safeguards
set up to protect the people. It may be that a closer union between the
legislative and executive branches would be desirable, but until that
occurs the question remains as to whether Congress has the power to
say to the contractor, "You shall not make excessive profits out of the
national emergency, but we will leave it to another branch of the govern-
ment to say what part of your profit is excessive."
An answer to that question may be provided by the case of Panama
Refining Company v. Ryan,24 wherein the National Industrial Recovery
Act was challenged on the ground that* an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority had been attempted by Congress. 25 When de-
claring the statute unconstitutional, the court said: "Section 9(c) does
not state whether, or in what. circumstances or under what conditions,
22 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Nugent trans., D. Appleton & Co.,
New York, 1900), Vol. 1, p. 137-8.
23 B1. Com., I, 146.
24 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935).
25 The immediate challenge was directed to Section 9(c) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. at L. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. §701(9) (c), wherein the
president was authorized to "prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from
storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by,
any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State."
The statute also provided that violation of any such order should be visited with
criminal penalties.
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the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum
or petroleum products produced in excess of the State's permission. It
establishes no criterion to govern the President's course. It does not
require any finding by the President as a condition of his action... it gives
to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to
lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And dis-
obedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine or imprison-
ment." 26 As applied to the immediate problem, it should be remembered
that the Revenue Act of 1943 declares that whenever in the opinion of the
renegotiation board profits are considered excessive, then and in that
case, the board is to take certain steps to renegotiate the contract.
27
Nothing is said as to what is a reflection of excessive profits, but that
determination is left entirely to the executive branch of the government.
It was also argued, in the Panama Refining case, that the preamble
of the statute, which contained a "declaration of policy," should be
treated as providing sufficient standards to guide the administrator.
That argument was rejected, however, when the court failed to find,
in such general outline of policy, the detailed circumstances and condi-
tions which would be essential to form a guide to administration. The
factors said to be important, in the renegotiation statute, as a guide
to the determination of "excessive profits" 28 would seem to be no more
specific than those held insufficient in the Panama Refining case. The
probable honesty or good motive of the administrator there was held
no substitute for constitutional requirement, 29 and will probably be no
more effective to overcome challenge to the renegotiation statute, if one
is made.
Other illustrations of opposition to uncontrolled delegation of authority
may be found in Marshall Field & Company v. Clark30 and J. W. Hamp-
ton & Company v. United States.31 It should not be thought, however,
that all delegation is improper, for as was once said by an eminent court,
"To assert that a law is less than a law because it is made to depend on a
future event or act, is to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely
for the public welfare, whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future, and impossible to be fully
known...The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it
can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There
26 293 U. S. 388 at 415, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 at 456.
27 H. R. 3687, Title VII, §701(b) (c) (1), 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 88 (1944).
28 H. R. 3687, Title VII, §701(b) (4) (A), 1 U. S. Cong. Serv. 84 (1944).
29 The court, on that point, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 at
420, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 at 458, said: "The question whether such a dele-
gation of legislative power is permitted by the Constitution is not answered by
the argument that it should be assumed that the President has acted, and will
act, for what he believes to be the public good. The point is not one of motives
but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute."
80 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892).
31 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1928).
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are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend,
which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore,
be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legis-
lation.'
3 2
So, in order to secure the exact effect intended by acts of legislation,
the vesting of discretion in administrative officers to make public regula-
tions interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even
to the extent of providing for penalty in case of breach thereof, has been
held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power.3 But a cardinal
distincton must be observed between the law-making and the administra-
tive functions. That distinction was admirably set forth in the case of
Cincinnati, "Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Company v. Commis-
sioners,34 where the court noted that the "true distinction, therefore, is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily in-
volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law." 35 It would seem, then, that the authority delegated by the re-
negotiation statute impinges more closely on the former when it places
in the hands of the administrator the power to determine the "excessive
profit" to be recaptured.
Lest a determination of the unconstitutionality of the Revenue Act
of 1943, insofar as this problem is concerned, appear too simple, one
more case of recent date should be considered-that of Yakus v. United
States,36 which dealt with the validity of the Emergency Price Control
Act,37 as amended by the Inflation Control Act. 38 A declaration of
policy found in those statutes stated the congressional purpose to be
one designed, among other things, to "stabilize prices and to prevent
speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents;
to eliminate and prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation, specula-
tion, and other disruptive practices resulting from abnormal market
conditions or scarcities caused by or contributing to the national emer-
gency. . .. -39 The standard according to which the administrator was
to exercise his authority to fix prices was reasonably confined to the
maximum prices obtaining during a given period of time with some
leeway for unusual conditions. In concluding that such statute was valid,
the court said: "The Act is thus an exercise by Congress of its legislative
32 Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 at 498-9 (1873).
33 J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed.
624 (1928); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563
(1911); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29 S. Ct. 671, 53
L. Ed. 1013 (1909); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 S. Ct.
367, 51 L. Ed. 523 (1907); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349, 48
L. Ed. 525 (1904); Ex parte Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444, 41 L. Ed. 813
(1897).
34 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
85 1 Ohio St. 77 at 88.
36 - U. S. -, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. (adv.) 653 (1944).
37 56 Stat. at L. 23, 50 U. S. C. A. §901 et seq.
38 56 Stat. at L. 767, 50 U. S. C. A. §901 et seq.
39 56 Stat. at L. 23(a), 50 U. S. C. A. §901(a).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
power. In it Congress has stated the legislative objective, has prescribed
the method of achieving that objective-maximum price fixing-and has
laid down standards to guide the administrative determination of both
the occasions for the exercise of price-fixing power, and the particular
prices to be established. . .The Constitution as a continuously operative
charter of government does not demand the impossible or the imprac-
ticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon
which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the
application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances
impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate. The essentials of
the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy
and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of
conduct. . .These essentials are preserved when Congress has specified
the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascer-
tained from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it
directs that its statutory command shall be effective. ' ' 40 Although, in
the Yakus case, the United States Supreme Court may be said to have
gone far in recognizing that the legislative function may be limited to
a determination of policy, leaving details and norms and standards of
measurement to the executive branch of the government, particularly
where the essential data could not readily be assembled by Congress
but might be more rapidly and efficiently gathered by an administrative
agency, still it has not broken down the requirement that reasonably
adequate standards must accompany such delegation of authority.
The clear lines of division between the three branches of the federal
government, existing at the time when the Constitution first went into
effect and continued for some sixty years thereafter, have gradually
given way under the proddings of expediency so as to form a twilight
area where the distinctions now present only a vague and indefinite
blur. The powers exercised by the executive branch have undoubtedly
reached a peak at the expense of those once deemed clearly belonging
to the legislature, contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitu-
tion. But it cannot be said that this has been accomplished by fiat, or
without the knowledge and consent of the people for whose preservation
that Constitution was formulated. If they are content to permit such
unhampered delegation of power as is contained in the renegotiation
statute, however, there is no limit to the length to which such practice
might be put.
P. E. THuPiOw
SECURITY THROUGH ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE
Death and taxes have frequently been declared to be the most certain
of events, yet their approach often finds the average person financially
ill-prepared. In the case of death, often the largest and most readily
available source of money to discharge funeral expenses is apt to be a
life insurance policy carried by the deceased, but as some lapse of time
40 - U. S. - at -, 64 S. Ct. 660 at 667, 88 L. Ed. (adv.) 653 at 659.
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is likely to occur between death and payment thereon, the undertaker
is likely to require some more certain assurance of payment. Where
there is no other estate, and the living relatives present but an uncer-
tain credit risk at best, the undertaker is inclined to seek protection by
taking some form of assignment of the benefits of such insurance policy,
whether partial or total.
But he, in turn, to prevent the tying up of a disproportionate amount
of his own capital even for a short period, may seek to reassign such
security to a finance company which, seeking new fields of profitable
investment,1 may accept the same in expectation that the funds so ad-
vanced will be speedily and surely returned. The whole arrangement,
then, appears to be not only legitimate but also a reasonably prudent way
of handling the inevitable consequence of death in a civilized society.
Yet the simple transaction thus outlined may develop some unpleasant
legal complications for the parties concerned, judging from three recent
and conflicting decisions handed down by the Illinois Appellate Court.
2
They raise important questions as to whether or not the benefits of life
insurance policies are assignable and, if so, by whom they may be as-
signed. They also suggest some special cautions which may need to be
observed if litigation is to be based on such transactions.
The primary problem is, of course, whether an assignment of the
policy benefits may be made, for if not, all other questions are thereby
rendered inconsequential. As there is no standard form for a life insur-
ance contract,3 the language of the particular policy must be taken into
consideration. It may expressly authorize assignment and the manner
of making the same effective, 4 or may impliedly sanction the same
through negative words forbidding assignment in the event the policy
has been pledged to the insurer as security for loans made thereon. For
that matter, the contract may be entirely silent on the question, in which
case, following the view that restraints on alienation will not be pre-
sumed, 5 there should be no question of the right of either the insured or
the beneficiary to give an assignment.
In the case of the so-called "industrial" policy, however, the insurer
1 A service charge of 7% was noted in the case of Morticians' Acceptance Co. v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 277, 53 N.E. (2d) 30 (1944). If an average
transaction takes one month to complete, the rate of profit is simple to calculate.
2 Standard Discount Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 220, 53 N.E.
(2d) 27 (1944); Morticians' Acceptance Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill.
App. 277, 53 N.E. (2d) 30 (1944); Lain v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 Inl. App.
643, 54 N.E. (2d) 736 (1944). It is understood that leave to appeal has been granted
in the Morticians' Acceptance Co. case.
8 The Illinois Insurance Code makes no provision for a standard form of life
insurance contract. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 73, §925, dealing with funds exempt
from process, has been interpreted as being inapplicable to voluntary assign-
ments: Standard Discount Co. v. Polish Women's Alliance, 301 Ill. App. 512, 23
N.E. (2d) 199 (1939).
4 A common provision requires that the same be in writing and filed at the
home office of the insurance company. See Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insur-
ance (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1930) 2d Ed., p. 966.
5 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Western Union TeL Co., 155 Inl. 335, 40 N.E. 587
(1895); Traders Safety Building Corp. v. Shirk, 237 Ill. App. 1 (1925).
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has usually inserted a provision which commonly reads: "Any assign-
ment or pledge of this policy or of any of its benefits shall be void."03 It
was the existence of this clause which provoked the disagreement in the
cases above referred to; the First Division of the First District Appellate
Court holding that it did not prevent assignment by the beneficiary,
7
while the Third Division was equally emphatic that it did so operate.8
The latter view proceeds on the theory that as the terms of insurance poli-
cies are purely a matter of contract it was competent for the parties, in
the absence of statutory inhibition or public policy against the same, to
contract against assignment. 9
There would seem to be merit, however, in the opposite view which
rests upon the principle that when money becomes due to the beneficiary
under a policy it, like any other vested property right, should be freely
transferable. 10 If the rights of the beneficiary under the policy can be
said to be vested, there is a definite public policy in favor of alienation,"
and the argument that the burdens thereby placed upon the company
would be onerous is scarcely one for courts to consider.12 By recognizing
6 Such language is found in all policies of this type issued by the Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. The exact provision is quoted in all three cases referred to in note 2,
ante. It is likely to be present in policies issued by other companies: Tyler v.
National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 338, 172 S.E. 747 (1934).
7 Standard Discount Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 220, 53 N.E.
(2d) 27 (1944); Morticians' Acceptance Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Inl.
App. 277, 53 N.E. (2d) 30 (1944).
8 Lain v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 Ill. App. 643, 54 N.E. (2d) 736 (1944).
9 That view has the support of at least intermediate appellate decisions in other
jurisdictions where the precise provision has been held binding: Tyler v. National
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 338, 172 S.E. 747 (1934); Morkel v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 297 N. Y. S. 962 (1934); Oleska v. Kotur, (Ind. App.) 48 N.E. (2d)
88 (1943). See also Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co., 263 N. Y. S. 462 (1933), and
Heffernan v. Prudential Insurance Co., 150 N. Y. S. 644 (1914).
10 Such was the holding in Standard Discount Co. v. Polish Women's Alliance,
301 Ill. App. 512, 23 N.E. (2d) 199 (1939), where death benefits under a fraternal
life insurance policy were held recoverable by an assignee despite a by-law which
provided that the same could not be "pledged, transferred or assigned by either
the members or their beneficiaries." Italics added. The court, in the Lain case,
drew a distinction on the ground that the fraternal death benefits were payable
to a named beneficiary whereas in the case before it the policy also contained a
"facility of payment" clause making it doubtful, at the time of the insured's
death, just who would be entitled thereto. It appears to have overlooked the fact
that when the insurer chose the assignor as beneficiary, his rights became vested.
11 Goit v. National Protection Ins. Co., 25 Barb. (N.Y.) 189 (1855); Beck-Brown
Realty Co. v. Liberty Bell Ins. Co., 241 N. Y. S. 727 (1930); West Branch Ins. Co. v.
Helfenstein, 40 Pa. 289, 80 Am. Dec. 573 (1861); Pennebaker v. Tomlinson, 1 Tenn.
Ch. 598 (1874); J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Estelline State Bank, (Tex. Civ.
App.) 66 S.W. (2d) 1110 (1934); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Lucas Funeral
Home, (Tex. Civ. App.) 89 S.W. (2d) 468 (1936).
12 The interesting data furnished by defendant in Lain v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 322 Ill. App. 643 at 654, 54 N.E. (2d) 736 at 741 (1944), regarding the magni-
tude of its operations and the consequent delay in payment if it had to respect
such assignments, could be matched by any large corporation plagued by wage
assignments and garnishment proceedings. There seems to be no public agitation
to relieve them of such annoyances by abolishing wage assignments or repealing
statutes relating to garnishment or attachment.
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the assignment and treating such policy provisions as null and void,
courts would serve to make the policy benefits available more readily
to meet the needs of the moment than could even the most expeditious
claim department of any insurance company located in some other state.
Intimately connected with that problem is the subordinate one as to
who may make an assignment, assuming that one is permitted. If the
policy names an absolute beneficiary and such person is competent to
contract, it goes without saying that only the assignment of that person
would be recognized. A not uncommon provision found in policies, how-
ever, is one which permits of contingent beneficiaries, hence close atten-
tion must be given to the policy language. This is particularly the case
where the "industrial" type of policy is concerned for such policies usu-
ally contain a "facility of payment" clause under which the insurer is
given an option to pay either the named beneficiary or some other per-
son within certain expressed limits. Again, these provisions are not uni-
form 13 so no general rule can be announced with regard thereto. Prior
to the time the company exercises the option provided by such a clause,
all persons concerned may well have only an expectancy rather than a
vested interest. But it is possible to transfer such expectancy, 14 at least
by equitable if not by legal assignment, 15 so if assignment is taken from
the one whom the company later elects to treat as beneficiary, the as-
signee's rights should be respected. 16 It is clear, however, that the exer-
13 In the Lain case, the privilege conferred by the clause seemed to depend upon
(a) the named beneficiary's failure to surrender the policy and make proof of
loss within thirty days of death, or (b) being legally unqualified to give a valid
release, or (c) being dead prior to the death of the insured: 322 Ill. App. 643 at
645, 54 N.E. (2d) 736 at 737. If none of these eventualities occurred, the right of
the named beneficiary would seem to be absolute. By contrast, the provision in
the Morticians' Acceptance Co. case seems to have given the insurer the un-
qualified right to make payment to any one of a large class who might have an
insurable interest: 321 Ill. App. 277 at 279, 53 N.E. (2d) 30 at 31.
14 Assignments of expectancies in other than insurance cases have long been
recognized. As to assignments by an heir apparent, see In re Landis, 41 F. (2d)
700 (1930), cert. den. in Farmers' Bank of Mount Pulaski, Ill. v. Bickenbach, 282
U. S. 872, 51 S. Ct. 77, 75 L. Ed. 770 (1930); Hudson v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.
917 (1906); Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109 N.E. 1015 (1915); Brown v. Cun-
ningham, 303 Ill. App. 307, 25 N.E. (2d) 113 (1940). The effect of a warranty deed
on an after-acquired estate in land is well known: Montana Wheat Land Co. v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 308 Ill. 620, 139 N.E. 876 (1923); Remington v. Krenn &
Dato, 289 Ill. App. 548, 7 N.E. (2d) 618 (1937); White v. Bates, 234 Ill. 276, 84 N.E.
906 (1908).
15 Although it may be necessary that property be in existence and be legally
owned to support a legal assignment, Associated Seed Growers v. Geib, 125 F.
(2d) 683 (1942), Southern Kraft Corp. v. Standard Capital Corp., 40 N. Y. S. (2d)
947 (1943), Mueller v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 799 (1943),
there is no difficulty in supporting the same in equity, as the intent to transfer both
a present and any after-acquired interest will there be given effect if clearly ex-
pressed: Williams v. West Chicago St. R. R., 199 Ill. 57, 64 N.E. 1024 (1902);
Tennis v. Midkiff, 55 Ill. App. 642 (1894). The analogy to a trust, calling for
equitable enforcement, is strong.
16 Warren v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus, 149 Ill. 9, 38 N.E. 122, 25 L. R. A.
746 (1893); Graham v. Southern Ry. Co., 173 Ga. 573, 161 S.E. 125 (1931). In
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cise of such option cannot be trammeled by any outstanding assignment,
so that it is within the power of the insurer to elect to pay some other
beneficiary. 17 If, then, the person extending credit has failed to obtain
an assignment from all potential beneficiaries, he may likely fail to
attain his objective.
Enforcement of such assignments, if valid, will also pose problems.
It is fundamental that no assignment is binding on the debtor until he is
given notice thereof,'8 so that if the assignee fails to give such notice of
his rights he cannot complain should payment be made to the assignor.
Proper notice would require the insurer to withhold payment at least until
it is satisfied that the assignment is a genuine one, and, in all cases of
doubt, the company could seek protection by instituting an interpleader
action.19 It might even properly stipulate in the policy that, to be effective,
such notice should be binding only if, and when, delivered at the home
office of the company, 20 so the policy should be closely scrutinized in that
regard. Of course, if the company waives such notice, either expressly or
by its own conduct in rejecting the tendered assignment, 21 it cannot later
complain of the absence of notice and will not be permitted to act in
derogation of the rights of the assignee.
After notice has been given, the company may still refuse to honor
the assignment and suit by the assignee may then become essential. When
contemplating action, the person extending the credit should be particu-
larly careful to discriminate between the two kinds of assignment, i.e.
legal and equitable; should determine the proper person to sue as plain-
tiff; and should also observe the jurisdictional power of the court in which
the suit is to be brought. 22 A fundamental distinction exists between a
Morticians' Acceptance Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 277, 53 N.E.
(2d) 30 (1944), the court denied recovery on three such assignments because the
insurer ultimately elected a different person as beneficiary than the one who gave
the assignment.
17 That may have been the motive, in the Morticians' Acceptance Co. case, for
the company's choice of the named beneficiary in his representative capacity as
administrator rather than paying the proceeds to him in his individual right
under which style he had given the assignment.
18 Savage v. Gregg, 150 Ill. 161, 37 N.E. 312 (1894); Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
373 Ill. 256, 26 N.E. (2d) 114 (1940), reversing 300 Ill. App. 96, 20 N.E. (2d) 804
(1939).
19 The right to institute such action might be open to question for lack of a
dispute between the beneficiary and the assignee: Kile v. Goodrum, 87 Ill. App.
462 (1899), Supreme Council of Western Catholic Union v. Murrin, 154 Ill. App.
465 (1910). If the beneficiary should indicate a purpose to repudiate the assign-
ment, and he would be prone to do so if the company were to indicate a willing-
ness to pay despite the assignment, the necessary conflict of interests to support
interpleader would not be hard to find.
20 See standard form of life insurance policy in Vance, Handbook of the Law of
Insurance (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1930), 2d Ed., p. 966. See also Brady v. Loring,
70 Ill. App. 191 (1897).
21 In Morticians' Acceptance Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 277,
53 N.E. (2d) 30 (1944), the insurer did return the assignments with a statement
that it did not consider the same effective, but liability was imposed despite
this.
22 A failure to observe these requirements tends to weaken the decision in
Standard Discount Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 220, 53 N.E. (2d)
27 (1944), and certain expressions therein might not stand the test of criticism.
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total, or legal, assignment on the one hand, and a partial, or equitable,
assignment on the other. The former has long been recognized in courts
of law,23 and action thereon in the name of the assignee is specifically
authorized by the Illinois Civil Practice Act provided the complaint dis-
closes the facts therein made necessary. 24 Such action may well be brought
in an inferior court depending on the amount sought to be recovered, 25 and
no power of attorney would be required to support such suit as the mere
giving of the assignment operates to transfer the right of action.
26
Suits upon equitable, or partial, assignments can only be maintained
before courts possessing equitable jurisdiction.27 Confusion seems to have
led the court, in the Standard Discount Company case, to fail to recognize
this fact and led it to affirm a judgment in favor of an assignee holding
a partial assignment rendered by the Municipal Court of Chicago. That
court lacks equitable jurisdiction in the true sense of that term,28 and the
existence of a power of attorney authorizing the assignee to sue for the
demand should not operate to convert an equitable claim into a legal one. 29
The power thereby given might warrant suit at law by the assignee-
attorney-in-fact for the whole of the demand, but if such action is brought
it should be instituted in the name of the assignor-principal who holds the
legal title to the cause of action. 0 Although the Illinois Civil Practice Act
permits the joinder of several parties in one action who have claims aris-
ing out of the same transaction,3 ' that statute does not aid such decision
23 Ball v. Chadwick, 46 Ill. 28 (1867); State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour &
Co., 259 Ill. App. 589 (1931), affirmed in 345 Ill. 160, 177 N.E. 702 (1931).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §146.
25 In the Municipal Court of Chicago, for example, the case would be a fourth-
class action under ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, §357, if the amount involved was less
than $1000. Smaller claims might be brought before a justice of the peace, under
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 79, §16, provided service could be obtained in the county.
26 Townsend v. Gregory, 132 II. App. 192 (1907); Gallagher v. Schmidt, 231 Inl.
App. 168 (1924), reversed in 313 Ill. 40, 144 N.E. 319 (1924); People, for use of
Vancil Motor Co. v. Weaver, 313 Ill. App. 317, 40 N.E. (2d) 83 (1942).
27 Safford v. Miller, 59 Ill. 205 (1871); Chandler v. Green, 101 Ill. App. 409 (1902);
Warren v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus, 149 IML 9, 38 N.E. 122 (1893); Phillips v.
Edsall, 127 Ill. 535, 20 N.E. 801 (1889).
28 Its jurisdiction rests solely upon Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, §357, which does
not confer power in equitable actions. Attempts to exercise such jurisdiction have
been rejected in Maiss v. Met. Amusement Ass'n, 146 Ill. App. 196 (1909), affirmed
in 241 Ill. 177, 89 N.E. 268 (1909); People ex rel. Dr. Pierre Chemical Co. v. Munici-
pal Court of Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 431, 17 N.E. (2d) 999 (1938).
29 The whole theory behind the use of a power of attorney is that the agent is
not seeking to enforce his own claim, assuming he has one, but rather is pursuing
the claims of his principal. Such theory begs all questions regarding assignments.
30 Wey v. Dooley, 134 Ill, App. 244 (1907); Olson v. Peterson, 50 Ill. App. 327
(1893); Creighton v. Village of Hyde Park, 6 Ill. App. 272 (1880); Dazey v. Mills,
for use of Pinkham, 10 Ill. 67 (1848).
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §147. The court, in the Standard Discount Co.
case, intimated that the existence of such statute had changed the distinctions
between legal and equitable assignments. The authorities cited in support of such
view fail to justify any such conclusion. Supreme Court Rule 10, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 110, §259.10, on the other hand, specifically declares that "all matters
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for there was no apparent attempt therein to join the assignor, either as
plaintiff or defendant,32 it does not purport to change the nature of the
respective interests of the parties, and, in any event, it does not have
operative effect in the Municipal Court of Chicago.33
A person holding an equitable assignment, therefore, should be alert
to bring the correct type of action before the proper court, suing in his
own name on the equitable chose in action and joining the assignor, either
as plaintiff or defendant, if necessary, in order that the court might pro-
tect the rights of all the parties. If, in addition to taking an equitable
assignment, he should receive a power of attorney to sue for the whole
demand,3 4 he may have a choice to proceed in the name of the principal
by legal action predicated thereon. But, as payment to the principal could
well be a defense to a suit based on the power of attorney, 35 the equitable
assignee would do well to use the equitable remedy in preference to the
legal one, or see that he attains the position of a legal assignee from the
outset.
88
It might well be gathered that financing a funeral in the fashion indi-
cated herein is a business not lacking in risk, but as long as there seems
to be profit in the venture as well as a service to be rendered in time of
acute need, it is not unlikely that the practice will continue. For the sake
of clarity in the law, therefore, it is to be hoped that these suggestions
will be followed and prove helpful in protecting the rights of all concerned.
L. A. SwANsoN
which, prior to January 1, 1934, were within the jurisdiction of a court of equity
* . . shall be heard and decided in the manner heretofore practiced in courts of
equity." Even more enlightening is the recent case of Freese v. Streicher,-Ohio
App.-, 55 N.E. (2d) 131 (1942), involving an almost parallel set of facts.
32 One who should be joint plaintiff may be made a party defendant, on proper
showing, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §147.
83 Procedure therein is regulated by separate statute and rules adopted pursuant
thereto: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, §§374-5. The Civil Practice Act was expressly
declared inapplicable in Sherman v. Green, 152 Ill. App. 166 (1909); Kellogg v.
Kellogg, 302 l. App. 604, 24 N.E. (2d) 260 (1939), cause transferred 371 Ill. 241,
20 N.E. (2d) 585 (1939).
84 There might be doubt as to the ability of the attorney-in-fact to delegate the
authority conferred thereby: Doggett v. Greene, 254 Ill. 134, 98 N.E. 219 (1912).
In Standard Discount Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 220, 53 N.E.
(2d) 27 (1944), however, the question was obviated by the use of a printed form,
probably furnished by the finance company, in which the power was conferred
directly on the plaintiff rather than upon the undertaker and by him assigned over.
35 As a power of attorney is revocable by the principal at will, unless it be a
power coupled with an interest consonant with Gilbert v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 548 (1871),
the principal would be free to make collection personally. Suit by the agent in the
principal's name would clearly be subject to the defence of payment: Holden v.
Rutland R. R. Co., 73 Vt. 317, 50 A. 1096 (1901).
s This may require the finance company to advance the face value of the
policy, paying part to the undertaker and the balance to the beneficiary. In view of
the uncertainty in cases of contingent beneficial interests, it is doubtful if the
risk would warrant such action, hence partial assignments will probably continue
to be taken. Some form of non-transferrable note, given to the beneficiary and pay-
able only from a specific fund, if collected, might serve the purpose.
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MODIFICATION OF LUMP-SUM ALIMONY DECREES
Notice has previously been taken of the fact that the act of placing a
label on a legal concept is generally sufficient to foreclose further inde-
pendent thought about it.' Once the concept is cataloged, judicial minds
are prone to apply the inevitable consequences of the label so affixed
rather than to examine the concept anew in the light of the differing cir-
cumstances thrown up by a particular case. Such an idea would seem
to be amply illustrated by the decision in the recent case of Banck v.
Banck2 in which the majority of the court, having concluded that alimony
was involved, proceeded to the inevitable conclusion that the remarriage
of the recipient thereof demanded a modification of the decree to bar
further payments. The facts of that case disclosed that, after a divorce
suit had been started, the wife filed a counterclaim charging wilful deser-
tion. The parties mutually agreed to a settlement under which the
husband was to pay to the wife the gross sum of $4,500 in designated
installments in full of all claims for alimony, and other property rights in
addition to giving up his interest in certain real estate. A divorce was
subsequently granted upon the counterclaim. The decree recited such
settlement, approved the terms thereof, and imposed a lien on the ex-
husband's interest in other real estate to insure payment of the deferred
installments. After some $2,100 had been paid pursuant to the decree and
the settlement, the ex-wife married again. Thereupon the ex-husband
petitioned to be relieved from further payments.3 The trial court granted
such petition and, upon appeal to the Appellate Court for the Third
District, the majority thereof affirmed such order on the ground that as
the provision was one for alimony it was subject to the express manda-
tory language of the statute. Had the court been more observant of the
actual intent of the parties and less concerned with the label placed
thereon, however, an entirely different result might well have been
achieved.
While the lump-sum settlement in lieu of alimony is not infrequently
referred to as "alimony" or "alimony in gross," it is clearly something
distinct from alimony as that term is used in divorce cases. The latter
term originally comprehended that allowance which was made to a woman
on a decree of divorce for her support out of the estate of her husband.
4
While the term used to signify the allowance judicially granted to the wife
under a divorce a mensa et thoro,5 it has come generally to describe that
provision judicially made to a spouse upon an absolute divorce. 6 Its con-
1 See Hutcheson, Jr., "This Thing Men Call Law," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1934),
and Chafee, Jr., "The Disorderly Conduct of Words," 41 Col. L. Rev. 381 (1941).
2 322 fll. App. 369, 54 N.E. (2d) 577 (1944). Dady, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Leave to appeal has been denied.
3 He relied on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, §19. A proviso added in 1933, prior to
the decree of divorce, declares: "Provided further that a party shall not be en-
titled to alimony and maintenance after remarriage." See Laws 1933, p. 492.
4 Stillman v. Stillman, 99 Ill. 196 at 201, 39 Am. Rep. 21 at 24 (1881).
5 Prichard v. Prichard, 3 Sw. & Tr. 523, 164 Eng. Rep. 1378 (1864).
6 Lennahan v. O'Keefe, 107 Ill. 620 at 626 (1883).
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notation usually suggests an independent investigation of the circum-
stances of the parties and an exercise of discretion in determining the
extent of the award, both as to amount and duration,7 proceeding on the
ground of the fault and breach of duty of the person ordered to pay the
same.8 Being designed as a substitute for that duty, about to be terminated
by the divorce,9 it usually takes the form of a periodic payment open to
such revision as the equities of the case may, from time to time, require. 10
Gross alimony, on the other hand, though sometimes ordered by the
court," is generally thought of as a lump sum paid not so much as sup-
port money but as a property settlement between the parties in lieu of all
claims growing out of the marriage relation whether for release of in-
choate dower and right of homestead or for alimony in the normal sense.12
Though usually paid at one time, it may be made payable in installments
and this fact does not, and should not, alter its nature or effect.13 Whatever
may be the case with regard to the judicial right to modify the usual ali-
mony provision, 14 subsequent modification of alimony in gross is gener-
ally not permitted 5 unless, upon examination of the decree as a whole, it
appears that the allowance was intended as a substitute for the duty of
support previously owed.' 6
Themajority of the court in the Banck case, while admitting that a
property settlement agreement would be absolute and binding if it be
legal in all other respects, especially if kept separate and apart from the
decree, nevertheless rested its decision on two major propositions, to-wit:
(1) that the incorporation of the provisions of the settlement in the
divorce decree rendered the agreement nugatory by merger,' 7 and (2)
that the court possesses a continuing power to supervise and modify its
7 Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill. 19, 31 N.E. 109, 19 L. R. A. 811, 34 Am. St. Rep. 56 (1892).
8 Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 21 S. Ct. 735, 45 L. Ed. 1009 (1901); Barclay
v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N.E. 636, 51 L. R. A. 351 (1900).
9 It is fundamental that alimony must be granted at the time of the divorce,
for if not then included in the decree it may not be sought at some later date, even
though the court lacked the necessary personal jurisdiction to make such an
award: Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 147 N.E. 659 (1925).
10 On the right to revise a decree calling for periodic alimony, as well as the
factors to be considered when revision is sought, see Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill. 19, 31
N.E. 109, 19 L. R. A. 811, 34 Am. St. Rep. 56 (1892).
11 Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Il. 290 (1868). But see Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill. 551,
31 N.E. (2d) 955, 133 A. L. R. 855 (1941).
12 Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill. 19, 31 N.E. 109, 19 L. R. A. 811, 34 Am. St. Rep. 56 (1892).
13 Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 112 So. 190 (1927); Jones v. Jones, 216 Ky. 810,
288 S.W. 737 (1926); Scott v. Robertson, 212 Ky. 392, 279 S.W. 625 (1926); Guess v.
Smith, 100 Miss. 457, 56 So. 166, Ann. Cas. 1914A 300 (1911); Beard v. Beard, 57
Neb. 754, 78 N.W. 255 (1899). See also annotation in 71 A. L. R. 723.
14 On that point, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, 119, confers broad power on the
court to modify the decree from time to time "as shall appear reasonable and
proper."
15 Plaster v. Plaster, 47 II. 290 (1868); Buck v. Buck, 60 Ill. 241 (1871);
Maginnis v. Maginnis, 323 Ill. 113, 153 N.E. 654 (1926); Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370,
166 N.E. 85 (1929). See also cases cited in note 13, ante.
16 Welty v. Welty, 195 Ill. 335, 63 N.E. 161, 88 Am. St. Rep. 208 (1902).
17 The court cited Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E. (2d) 504 (1940), and
Maginnis v. Maginnis, 323 Ill. 113, 153 N.E. 654 (1926), on this point.
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decrees, insofar as alimony is concerned, whenever a change in circum-
stance arises' 8 or an event occurs calling for the application of the recent
amendment to the Divorce Act. 19 The court relied principally on the com-
paratively recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in Adler v. Adler
20
wherein it was indicated that parties to agreements respecting alimony
and property settlements have two avenues open to them. The first is to
make their settlement independent of the divorce decree and to rely
upon their ordinary contract rights to secure enforcement. The second
method suggested is to incorporate such agreement into the decree, merg-
ing the one in the other, and thereby secure the aid of the court for en-
forcement through the use of the contempt power. It had been there
determined that if the parties chose to travel the latter avenue, they were
bound thereby in all respects so that the court must, under the statute,
upon the remarriage of the recipient of alimony, order the cessation of
alimony payments.21
It is submitted, however, that the court in the Banck case erred in
applying the rule of the Adler case to the situation before it, for the install-
ment payments in the Adler decree were not fixed and certain in number
but were dependent upon the duration of the life of the recipient, hence
clearly designed as alimony. In the Banck case, on the other hand, not
only was the total sum to be paid fixed by settlement and decree, but the
amount of each installment and its due date was explicit. A basis for dif-
ferentiation, had the majority of the court desired one, was clearly present
but it seemed to prefer the view that public policy was opposed to the
idea that the recipient of alimony, no matter what kind, should obtain
financial assistance from an ex-spouse while also being entitled to support
from a new one.22
They might have argued that, regardless of the type of provision for
support or in lieu thereof, the fact of incorporation in the decree should be
the sole factor in determining the power of the court to order subsequent
modification. Pressed to its logical conclusion, such argument would mean
either that the parties were not free to settle their differences out of
court,23 or must be considered as surrendering their freedom to make
absolute contracts as the price of obtaining equitable enforcement for the
obligations thereof.2 4 It is true that, by incorporation in the decree, the
18 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N.E. 820 (1925). That case, however, dis-
closes that the incorporated property settlement was not one for a lump sum but
rather contemplated an agreed payment for life.
19 Laws 1933, p. 492; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, §19.
20 373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E. (2d) 504 (1940).
21 373 Ill. 361 at 371, 26 N.E. (2d) 504 at 508.
22 The dissenting judge expressed the view that he could see no sound basis for
such a policy if it permitted the spouse, who had collected a cash settlement, to
retain the same after remarriage while denying another, who could collect only
on an installment basis, to enforce the settlement so made: 322 Ill. App. 369 at 398,
54 N.E. (2d) 577 at 589-90.
23 The law is too plain that settlement out of court is to be favored rather than
hampered: Frank v. Heaton, 56 Ill. App. 227 (1894). In divorce cases, however, the
agreement must not involve collusion: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, §11, and see
also Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370, 166 N.E. 85 (1929).
24 Welty v. Welty, 195 Ill. 335, 63 N.E. 161, 88 Am. St. Rep. 208 (1902).
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alimony settlement receives not only judicial approval but gains a power-
ful sanction not given to the ordinary contract for the payment of money.
But a distinction could be, and perhaps ought to be, drawn between those
decretal provisions respecting alimony in which the court merely approves
as fair and reasonable the acknowledgement of fixed indebtedness by the
guilty spouse as contrasted with provisions imposed by the court when
called upon to exercise its discretionary power to award alimony against
the protest of the party ordered to pay. The former type, regarded as
being absolute and vested, might be treated as being entitled to no more
than ordinary judicial backing by execution process such as would be the
case, for example, on a stipulated deficiency judgment in a mortgage fore-
closure case. The latter, because discretionary and contingent, could well
be favored with the support of the most potent weapon in the arsenal of
equity.25 So long as alimony is treated as something other than a debt,
however, it is unlikely that any court would be willing to draw such a
distinction, hence incorporation of any settlement in a divorce decree must
probably continue at the price and upon the terms indicated by the deci-
sion in the Banck case.
Assuming the incorporated settlement to be alimony in the accepted
sense of that term, the problem still remains as to whether subsequent
changes in the status of the parties, such as remarriage of the recipient,
warrant a holding as drastic as that laid down by the Appellate Court.
It was the view of the majority that the proviso contained in the Divorce
Act applied without question to every form of alimony, whether periodic or
in gross, if encompassed within the decree of divorce. As a qualification
upon the power of a court to award periodic alimony, the proviso is no
doubt a complete and definite limitation well within the power of the legis-
lature.26 But if there is a distinction in the function of a court when approv-
ing a lump sum alimony settlement in contrast to its exercise of power
in awarding alimony in accordance with its discretion, it does not follow
that a limitation on the latter power also operates to delimit the former.
It seems more likely, as viewed by the dissenting justice, 27 that the legis-
lative intent was merely to give formal ratification to the previously ex-
pressed judicial attitude that as periodic alimony was a substitute for
support the same should cease when the burden of support was assumed
by another. 28 It does not appear that the legislature contemplated banning
25 Enforcement by contempt process will probably have to be retained, even
though it smacks somewhat of imprisonment for debt, as experience has shown
that the alimony payer who is forced to pay against his will is less likely to respect
that order if not so coerced.
26 Since the sole power of the Illinois courts to award alimony or even to deal
with divorce matters rests upon statutory grounds: Floberg v. Floberg, 358 Il.
626, 193 N.E. 456 (1934), Trenchard v. Trenchard, 245 I]l. 313, 92 N.E. 243 (1910),
Thomas v. Thomas, 51 MU. 162 (1869), it follows that the legislature may abrogate
or amend the statute at will except insofar as vested rights may be concerned.
27 322 IIl. App. 369 at 398, 54 N.E. (2d) 577 at 590.
28 Stillman v. Stiliman, 99 Ill. 196, 39 Am. Rep. 21 (1881), ably expresses the
judicial policy as to termination of periodic alimony on remarriage. The majority
of the court in the Banck case acknowledge that the 1933 amendment of the
Divorce Act was merely a crystallization of such policy into legislative language:
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lump-sum settlements or placing any impediments in the way of their
operation. If that was the case, it would have been easy to express that
purpose with more certainty than can be gathered from an examination
of the statute. To read in a doctrine that such settlements are illegal to
the extent that, and if, by reason of an extension of credit, payment would
occur after remarriage of the recipient, as has been done, 29 goes farther
than the legislative language would seem to warrant.
More consistent with the idea that the contractual right to lump-sum
alimony is a vested rather than a contingent one is the decision in McKey
v. Willett30 which upheld the transfer of the beneficiary's right to such
alimony to her trustee in bankruptcy against the argument that the settle-
ment therein was not final because open to possible modification. The deci-
sion in In re Fiorio3l also treated alimony of this type as amounting to a
vested property right which could be dealt with as an asset of the estate
of the bankrupt recipient. The vitality of such holdings is thrown open to
attack should the Banck decision stand, for it is difficult to conceive how
future payments under such a settlement can be both vested and contin-
gent at one and the same time.32 To suggest that the right to the benefits
of the settlement are to be treated as vested but subject to be divested
upon remarriage of the recipient would seem to be adding a term to the
settlement that the parties themselves either did not or could not agree
upon. By holding that such should be regarded as an implied provision of
the settlement if the same becomes incorporated in the decree, as was
suggested in the Banck case, seems to be exacting too high a price for
the privilege of securing equitable enforcement of that contract.
Fortunately, the even more recent decision in Drangle v. Lindauer3
seems to point a way out for those who seek a binding settlement of a
potential alimony liability at a time when they are unable to make an
immediate cash settlement. In that case, the husband bound himself to
pay his wife, should divorce be granted, a stipulated sum in the event of
her remarriage within a specified time with a correspondingly lesser sum,
on a sliding scale, if the remarriage did not occur until an even more post-
poned date. Such contract was not incorporated in the decree, although
there was a provision therein for periodic alimony. Following the decree,
the ex-wife remarried, thereby terminating the liability under the provi-
322 Ill. App. 369 at 376, 54 N.E. (2d) 577 at 581. Though the majority opinion cites
De La Cour v. De La Cour, 363 Ill. 545, 2 N.E. (2d) 896 (1936), in support of its
decision, that case does not seem to be in point, for the Supreme Court did not
disturb the original decree for the payment of a lump sum payable in monthly
installments nor did the petition seek to set aside that provision of the decree.
29 In Miller v. Miller, 317 Ill. App. 447, 46 N.E. (2d) 102 (1943), it was declared
that a provision in a settlement agreement requiring the payments to continue
despite remarriage of the payee would be regarded as illegal. See also Adler v.
Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E. (2d) 504 (1940).
30 248 Ill. App. 602 (1928).
31 128 F. (2d) 562 (1942).
82 Congressional action in taxing alimony to the recipient for income tax pur-
poses, under 26 U. S. C. A. §22(k), while not strictly in point, tends to indicate a
purpose toward regarding the same as a vested right, particularly if the taxpayer
is on an accrual basis.
33 323 Ill. App. 23, 54 N.E. (2d) 751 (1944).
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Sion for periodic payments. She thereafter brought suit upon the contract
to pay in the event of her remarriage, and was met by the contention that
the contract was invalid by reason of the provision of the Divorce Act
above referred to. It was held, nevertheless, that since such contract did
not call for the payment of alimony but was, in effect, a property settle-
ment it did not fall within the operation of that statute and recovery on
the contract was permitted. By applying a slight amount of knowledge on
the subject of annuities, it is possible to see how these parties eventually
arrived at the place which the Banck decision says they could not reach.
Such subterfuge would be entirely unnecessary if courts would recog-
nize that, despite terminology, lump-sum settlements even though payable
in installments and approved by judicial decree should be given the effect
intended by the parties thereto, to-wit: as conferring a vested but deferred
right to a precise sum of money in full and final settlement of all obliga-
tions arising from the former marital status. As such settlements are
intended to be something different from the previously existing obligation
to support they should not be considered in that light, or even treated as
alimony, but rather should be dealt with as would any other compromise
agreement. To deny them this effect is tantamount to requiring the recipi-
ent to remain unmarried until after the deferred installments have been
paid in full.
T. F. BAYER
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
HusBAND AND WIF-SEPAATION AND SEPARATE MAINTENANcE-WHETHER,
UNDER ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE, AN ACTION TO ADJUDIcATE THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF THE SPOUsES MAY BE JOINED WITH AN ACTION FOR SEPARATE MAIN-
TENANCE-The plaintiff, in the case of Petta v. Petta,1 sued her husband
for separate maintenance. He filed a counterclaim seeking an absolute
divorce. The trial court found for the plaintiff and against the defendant
on the counterclaim but denied the plaintiff any right to support money
by reason of a provision contained in the decree constituting a division
of certain real estate between the parties. No such relief had been
sought by the plaintiff, however, nor had any agreement with regard
thereto been made by the parties. Plaintiff appealed from that portion
of the decree which provided for the division of property rights on the
ground that the court lacked power to adjudicate such matters. In
reversing such decree, the Appellate Court for the First District dis-
tinguished the holdings of certain earlier Illinois decisions 2 by pointing out
that the statements therein were mere dicta, hence did not change the
rule laid down in other cases to the effect that a court has no jurisdiction,
1 321 Ill. App. 512, 53 N.E. (2d) 324 (1944).
2 In Spalding v. Spalding, 361 Ill. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935), and Moore v. Moore,
335 Ill. 517, 167 N.E. 792 (1929), separate maintenance proceedings were subse-
quently amended into divorce cases. They are, therefore, no authority for the
rule as to separate maintenance. In Decker v. Decker, 279 Ill. 300, 116 N.E. 688
(1917), the lower court had settled the property rights of the parties in an action
for separate maintenance but, on appeal, the exercise of such jurisdiction was
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in a separate maintenance proceeding, to settle property rights.3
To obviate the hardships of the common law, which furnished the
wife who was forced to live separate and apart from her husband with
only an uncertain remedy, 4 the legislature, in 1819, passed a statute
which gave her an equitable remedy against her spouse to compel sup-
port. 5 Being a statutory remedy and one unknown to the common law,
the scope of the jurisdiction is limited. As a consequence, when granting
relief thereunder, the court cannot exercise its general equity powers and
provide complete relief but is limited by the authority conferred on it
through the statute. 6
That proceeding must be carefully distinguished from the one pro-
vided by the Divorce Act 7 for the former merely contemplates a
temporary separation of the spouses while the latter is designed to
procure a dissolution of the marriage bond.8 In some respects, though,
the relief granted by both proceedings is similar. For example, the
court has the power in either action to provide the wife with temporary
support pending a final adjudication of the cause so long as it does not
appear that the separation was produced by the fault of the wife.9 It is
also possible, in each action, to award the wife an allowance of attorney's
fees to enable her to carry on the proceeding. 10 But such similarity
rests upon express provisions in the two statutes." Only the Divorce
Act contains a provision for the settlement of the property rights of the
parties in case a divorce is granted, 12 while the separate maintenance
statute is silent on the subject. It would seem reasonable, then, to
suppose that had the legislature intended to confer such jurisdiction on
the court hearing a separate maintenance matter, it would have ex-
pressly provided the power as it did in the Divorce Act. In the absence
of such provision, the instant case appears rightly decided, especially
not questioned, hence anything said with regard thereto was mere dicta. Glennon
v. Glennon, 299 Ill. App. 13, 19 N.E. (2d) 412 (1939), was decided on the basis
of the dicta found in the Decker case, while Grossman v. Grossman, 304 Ill.
App. 507, 26 N.E. (2d) 678 (1940), was based on the authority of the Glennon case.
3 Sphor v. Kraus, 197 Ill. App. 348 (1916); McAdams v. McAdams, 267 Ill. App.
124 (1932); Pearsons v. Pearsons, 282 Ill. App. 92 (1935), petition for leave to
appeal denied: 282 Inl. App. xlviii.
4 In Ross v. Ross, 69 Ill. 569 (1873), the court noted that her only privilege was
to purchase necessaries on his credit.
5 See Laws 1819, p. 35, § 3. The statute was amended, in 1935, to extend the
remedy to the husband as well as the wife: Laws 1935, p. 913. The amended
statute now appears as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 68, §§ 22-3. The scope of the action
is well illustrated by Schneider v. Schneider, 312 Ill. App. 59, 37 N.E. (2d)
911 (1941).
6 Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370, 166 N.E. 85 (1929).
7 InI. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 1.
8 Bushnell v. Cooper, 289 Ill. 260, 124 N.E. 521, 6 A.L.R. 1517 (1919); McAdams
v. McAdams, 267 Ill. App. 124 (1932).
9 Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N.E. 255 (1909).
10 Harding v. Harding, 144 Ill. 588, 32 N.E. 206 (1892); McAdams v. McAdams,
267 InI. App. 124 (1932).
" Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 16, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 68,
§ 22.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 18.
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since there was no prayer for such relief. 18
Conceding, then, that a proceeding for the settlement of property
rights between the spouses 14 and one for separate maintenance would
constitute two distinct causes of action, the question presents itself as to
whether or not these two distinct claims may be asserted in one suit.
That question has never been directly passed upon in Illinois,15 but the
court in the instant case seemed to intimate that such joinder would not
be possible.'0 Although the joinder of such causes of action might have
been regarded as improper under former practice, the liberal provisions
of the Civil Practice Act specifically authorize the joining of several
claims, whether legal or equitable, subject to the limitation that the
court might, in its discretion, order separate trials where it is incon-
venient to try the actions together. 17 Under these provisions, the Illinois
Supreme Court has sanctioned the joining of an action for absolute
divorce with one for the partition of real estate jointly owned by the
parties,' 8 the court pointing out that such joinder was proper because
both causes of action grew out of the same difficulties, the parties were
the same, and both causes could be conveniently tried in a single suit
thus avoiding a multiplicity of suits.
In view of the liberality shown in that case, and other causes, 19 it
might well be assumed that the court would not object to the joinder of
an action for separate maintenance with some other action between the
parties if the latter is presented as an independent claim cognizable by
the court on some other ground than the separate maintenance statute.
Such joinder should not inconvenience the court but rather aid it since,
when asked to determine what would be a reasonable amount to be
allowed for support, the court would have before it the evidence as to
any property owned by the spouses, whether owned separately or
jointly.20 It would also convenience the parties, for it would be possible
to settle in one action what would otherwise require two or more suits.
MARY JANz SACCONE
Is It is axiomatic that a court should grant no other relief than is prayed for:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 158. See also Bauer v. Lindgren, 279 Ill. App. 397
(1935), and Kaifer v. Kaifer, 286 Ill. App. 433, 3 N.E. (2d) 886 (1936), noted in 15
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14 Suits between them over property matters are sanctioned by Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 68, § 10.
15 In Glennon v. Glennon, 299 Il. App. 13, 19 N.E. (2d) 412 (1939), the court
incidentally expressed its belief that such joinder might be allowed under the
provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 168.
16 The court stated: "The argument that it is unfair that a wife who seeks
separate maintenance, only, cannot have her property rights settled in that
proceeding, might properly be made to the legislature, but not to the courts."
See 321 Ill. App. 512 at 520, 53 N.E. (2d) 324 at 32.7. The court did note that
a separate proceeding could clearly be maintained for it cited Kartun v.
Kartun, 347 Ill. 510, 180 N. E. 423 (1932), which authorizes a suit for partition and
accounting between spouses.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 168(1).
Is Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 373 Ill. 352, 26 N.E. (2d) 108 (1940).
19 Duncan v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 37 N.E. (2d) 826 (1941), and Borman v. Oet-
zell, 382 Ill. 110, 46 N.E. (2d) 914 (1943).
20 Harding v. Harding, 144 mll. 588, 32 N.E. 206 (1892).
